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Abstract
This study investigates whether and to what extent publicly listed 
corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good 
corporate governance (CG) practices, and distinctively examines whether 
the observed cross-sectional differences in such CG disclosures can be 
explained by ownership and board mechanisms with specific focus on Saudi 
Arabia. The study’s results suggest that corporations with larger boards, a 
Big 4 auditor, higher government ownership, a CG committee, and higher 
institutional ownership disclose considerably more than those that are not. 
By contrast, the study finds that an increase in block ownership significantly 
reduces CG disclosure. The study’s results are generally robust to a number 
of econometric models that control for different types of disclosure indices, 
firm-specific characteristics, and firm-level fixed effects. The study’s results 
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have important implications for policy makers, practitioners, and regulatory 
authorities, especially those in developing countries across the globe.
Keywords
corporate governance, board structure, ownership structure, voluntary 
disclosure regime, multitheory, Saudi Arabia
This study seeks to contribute to the extant corporate governance (CG) litera-
ture by examining the extent to which publicly listed corporations voluntarily 
comply with and disclose good recommendations relating to their CG prac-
tices, and investigates whether corporate ownership and board mechanisms 
can explain observable cross-sectional differences in such CG disclosures 
with specific focus on Saudi Arabia.
Over the past decades, the adoption of CG codes by an increasing number 
of developing countries has generated a significant research interest on the 
actual extent of, and factors leading to or impeding implementation at the 
firm level, and on the consequences of such implementation at the macro or 
national level (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Andreasson, 2011; 
Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016; Ntim, Soobaroyen, & Broad, 2017; Salterio, 
Conrod, & Schmidt, 2013; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). In the main, such 
CG studies are motivated by an instrumental-led expectation that CG codes 
might help address systemic issues of corporate accountability, responsibil-
ity, corruption, and transparency (Christensen, Kent, Routledge, & Stewart, 
2015; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha, 
Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013; Tsamenyi, 
Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007), and thereby improve corporate perfor-
mance by reducing corporate financial risk in developing countries (Bauer, 
Eichholtz, & Kok, 2010; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmerman, 2006; 
Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Christensen et al., 2015; Giroud & Mueller, 2011; 
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Ntim, 2015; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013; Ntim, 
Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Renders, 
Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010; Tariq & Abbas, 2013).
To date, however, a good number of these studies report mixed results in 
terms of actual implementation and/or of positive consequences (Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Wieland, 2005; Yoshikawa 
& Rasheed, 2009). More importantly, whereas prior research indicates that 
corporate decisions, including disclosure choices and strategies, are often 
decided by corporate boards and owners (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), 
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existing studies that empirically examine the different extent to which a 
firm’s board and ownership mechanisms can serve as strong or weak anteced-
ents of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices are gener-
ally rare (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Hussainey & 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Salterio et al., 2013), but particu-
larly acute in developing countries (Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012; 
Rouf, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). This intuition is 
motivated by the fact that the capacity of CG codes to achieve good gover-
nance depends largely on the extent to which senior managers, owners, and 
companies are willing to engage in effective voluntary compliance and dis-
closure (Core, 2001; Ntim et al., 2013; Tariq & Abbas, 2013).
Thus, this study seeks to explore CG reforms that have been pursued in 
developing countries with specific focus on Saudi Arabia. Our decision to 
focus on Saudi Arabia is motivated by a number of reasons. First, and in line 
with global developments, Saudi has pursued CG reforms in the form of the 
2006 Saudi CG Code. As will be discussed further, and similar to most devel-
oping countries, the Saudi CG Code adopts a U.K.-style voluntary1 “comply 
or explain” compliance and disclosure regime (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; 
Piesse, Strange, & Toonsi, 2012). Distinct from most Anglo-American coun-
tries, the Saudi CG Code explicitly requires firms to go beyond the narrow 
financial and regulatory aspects of CG by addressing the interests of a broad 
range of stakeholders, such as creditors, customers, employees, local com-
munities, and suppliers (Capital Market Authority [CMA], 2006, p. 4), and 
thus, investigating CG practices in the Saudi context may contribute to the 
extant literature by providing new insights on the effectiveness of CG reforms 
in developing countries.
Second, the Saudi corporate context has distinctive cultural features of 
having strong hierarchical social structure (Al-Twaijry, Brierley, & Gwilliam, 
2002; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007) in which greater importance is usually 
attached to informal relationships, such as kingship and tribal affiliations 
than formal CG and accountability mechanisms like corporate boards and 
their subcommittees (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008). The Saudi corporate set-
ting is further characterized by concentrated ownership structures (mainly by 
government and families), prohibition of direct foreign equity holdings, and 
low levels of institutional ownership, resulting in insufficient activism by 
shareholders and a weak capacity to implement and enforce corporate regula-
tions (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Piesse et al., 2012). In particular, con-
centrated ownership renders the capital, corporate control, product, 
professional services, and top managerial labor markets weak (Gillan, 2006; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, 
Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012), which can impact negatively on the willingness 
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of corporations to engage in voluntary disclosure. Arguably, these contextual 
challenges raise serious empirical questions as to whether the 2006 Saudi 
voluntary compliance and disclosure CG Code can improve CG standards of 
Saudi listed corporations (Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2013; Munisi & Randoy, 
2013; Soliman, 2013a, 2013b).
Third, despite increasing theoretical and empirical evidence that the abil-
ity of any single theory to fully explain the reasons and motivations underly-
ing corporate voluntary disclosure behavior is limited (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), existing 
studies on voluntary disclosure are either largely descriptive in nature 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Bebenroth, 2005; Cromme, 2005; Pass, 2006; Werder, 
Talaulicar, & Kolat, 2005) or rely on single theoretical perspective (Bozec & 
Bozec, 2007; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & 
Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012), and thereby 
impairing the development of new theoretical insights, advancement, and 
understanding.
Fourth, and unlike most Arabic countries, Saudi Arabia is a major “G-20” 
economy, being the world’s largest producer of oil, as well as playing host to 
some of the world’s largest multinationals (Al-Filali & Gallarotti, 2012; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Samba Financial Group [SFG], 2009). For example, Saudi 
accounted for 44% and 25% of total Arab market capitalization and GDP, 
respectively, in 2010 (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; SFG, 2009). This means 
that unlike most Arabic countries, any CG failures may have serious implica-
tions far beyond the Middle East and developing countries.
Generally, and notwithstanding the increasing number of CG Codes in 
developing countries, such as Saudi Arabia (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009; Samaha et al., 2012), existing studies investigating the effectiveness of 
voluntary CG Codes in improving governance standards are disproportion-
ately concentrated in a few developed countries (Bebenroth, 2005; Bozec & 
Bozec, 2007; Cromme, 2005; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Pass, 2006; Pellens, Hillebrandt, & Ulmer, 
2001; Salterio et al., 2013; Werder et al., 2005). It is contended, however, that 
in developing countries with different cultural, regulatory, CG, and institu-
tional contexts, such as Saudi Arabia (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), 
voluntary compliance with CG Codes can be expected to vary from what has 
been found in developed countries. Therefore, an investigation of voluntary 
CG disclosures in developing countries, where there is a dearth of empirical 
evidence, is crucial in offering a more complete understanding of CG reforms 
and disclosure behavior. In this case, and although there have been a number 
of CG studies within the Saudi corporate context, notably by Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel (2008), Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010), Alshehri and Solomon 
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(2012), Piesse et al. (2012), Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Omar (2013), and 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2013), the current study differs from existing 
ones in terms of (a) its explicit construction of a Saudi CG disclosure index 
(SCGI) based directly on the 2006 Saudi CG Code, (b) its reliance on a larger 
panel data set drawn from the 2004 to 2010 period, and (c) its evaluation of a 
broader set of CG provisions and disclosures.
In doing so, the study extends, as well as makes a number of distinct and 
new contributions to the extant CG literature. First, using data extracted 
directly from annual reports of a sample of 80 Saudi listed corporations from 
2004 to 2010, the study contributes to the literature by providing detailed evi-
dence, for the first time, on the level of compliance with the 2006 Saudi CG 
Code by constructing a broad CG compliance and disclosure index containing 
65 CG provisions. Second, the study contributes to the literature by offering 
evidence on the extent to which the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG Code 
has helped in improving CG standards in Saudi listed corporations. Third, the 
study contributes to the literature by applying and informing the analysis with 
insights from a number of theories, including agency, legitimacy, resource 
dependence, and stakeholder theories. Finally, the study makes a new contri-
bution to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the extent to which 
corporate ownership and board mechanisms influence the level of CG disclo-
sure in Saudi listed corporations. This can improve current understanding of 
the main factors that drive the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of 
CG practices in a major developing Arabic country in which various stake-
holders, such as the Saudi government, the Saudi CMA, and the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul, 2012) take a keen interest in CG and stakeholder issues.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the Saudi stock exchange, CG reforms pursued, and the Saudi 
corporate context. The following sections review the antecedents of the prior 
voluntary CG disclosure literature and develop hypotheses, describe the data 
and research methodology, and report empirical results, while the conclusion 
contains a summary and a brief discussion of policy implications, limitations, 
and recommendations for future research.
The Saudi Stock Exchange, CG Policy Reforms, 
and the Saudi Corporate Context
Although formal public trading of stocks did not start in Saudi until the 
1980s, public corporations had long operated in the country in the mid-1930s, 
when the Arab Automobile corporation was established as the first joint stock 
corporation (Tadawul, 2012). By 1975, there were about 14 publicly listed cor-
porations, increasing further to 75 listed firms by 2000 (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 
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2012). The rapid economic expansion, arising from a boom in oil income in 
the 1970s, led to the formation of a number of large corporations and joint 
stock banks (Al-Filali & Gallarotti, 2012; Alsaeed, 2006). However, stock 
trading was not formalized until the early 1980s when the government 
embarked upon establishing an official stock exchange as part of the general 
reforms toward creating a free market economy (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 
2008; Tadawul, 2012). In 1984, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
was charged with the responsibility of developing, operating, regulating, and 
monitoring the market until the CMA was established in July 2003 (Al-Janadi 
et al., 2013; SFG, 2009). In 2003, and as a part of the CG reforms, the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul, 2012) was established with the responsibility of 
operating the market, while the CMA remained as the sole regulatory body of 
the market (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; Soliman, 2013a, 2013b). Since its 
establishment in 2003, the Tadawul has experienced rapid growth through 
greater listings and vibrant trading activities. For example, about 68 corpora-
tions were listed between 2007 and 2010 (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012). This 
increased the number of listed corporations substantially from 77 in 2005 to 
145 in December 2010 with a stock market capitalization of about US$533 
billion, and accounting approximately for 44% of total Arab stock market 
capitalization (International Finance Corporation [IFC], 2008; SFG, 2009; 
Tadawul, 2012).
With respect to CG, and although legislation regulating the behavior of 
corporations, their directors, and officers has long existed in Saudi Arabia in 
the form of the 1965 Companies Act (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Hussainey 
& Al-Nodel, 2008), there is a consensus that in a narrow sense, CG in Saudi 
Arabia was formally institutionalized by the publication of the Saudi CG 
Code in November 2006 (Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2013; Al-Nodel & 
Hussainey, 2010; CMA, 2006; Soliman, 2013a, 2013b). In fact, attempts at 
pursuing CG reforms to enhance CG standards in Saudi public corporations 
began in earnest in 2003, but early rapid growth in the stock market diverted 
the attention of the CMA and the relevant stakeholders from it (Alshehri & 
Solomon, 2012; SFG, 2009). However, a sudden fall of about 25% in value 
of listed stocks in February 2006 alone, and an overall fall of 53% by the end 
of 2006, wiping over US$480 billion off the market’s value highlighted the 
need to improve CG standards in Saudi publicly listed corporations (SFG, 
2009). As a result, academics, investors, and practitioners placed pressure on 
the CMA to urgently improve CG standards by (a) deepening the market, 
including increasing its size (e.g., number of listed firms) and allowing direct 
foreign/institutional investor participation2; (b) improving disclosure and 
transparency (DAT); and (c) clamping down on insider trading (Alshehri & 
Solomon, 2012; SFG, 2009).
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Consequently, a first draft of the Saudi CG Code was issued for consulta-
tion in July 2006 with the final version published in November 2006. The 
Code addresses a number of CG issues relating to (a) board of directors 
(BOD), (b) disclosure and transparency (DAT), (c) rights of shareholders and 
the general assembly (ROS), and (d) internal control and risk management 
(IRM) (CMA, 2006).3 Noticeably, the recommendations of the Saudi CG 
Code were largely similar to those of the U.K.’s Cadbury Report of 1992 
(Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 2012). For example, and similar to 
the Cadbury Report, the Saudi Code suggested an Anglo-American style uni-
tary BOD, consisting of executive and non-executive directors, who are pri-
marily accountable to shareholders operating within a voluntary (“comply or 
explain”) compliance and disclosure regime (see the appendix; CMA, 2006). 
Distinct from the Cadbury Report, however, it explicitly requires Saudi firms 
to address not only the interests of shareholders but also those of other stake-
holders, such as employees and local communities, although this part of the 
Code is relatively less developed and clear as to their implications for CG, 
compliance, and disclosure (CMA, 2006, p. 4).
In addition to pursuing CG reforms, and as has been previously explained, 
the Saudi corporate context is characterized by (a) a highly hierarchical social 
structure, (b) concentrated ownership, (c) low level of institutional share-
holding and weak shareholder activism, (d) the absence of direct foreign/
institutional investors, (e) weak enforcement of corporate regulations, and (f) 
weak market for capital, managerial labor, and corporate control (Alsaeed, 
2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012). As a result, critical con-
cerns have been expressed as to whether, given the relative uniqueness of the 
Saudi corporate context, a voluntary compliance and disclosure regime like 
the 2006 Saudi CG Code can be effective in raising CG standards in Saudi 
Arabia (IFC, 2008; SFG, 2009). Consequently, we seek to examine the extent 
to which Saudi listed corporations are voluntarily complying with the CG 
provisions contained in the 2006 Saudi CG Code and investigate whether 
corporate ownership and board mechanisms can explain observable differ-
ences in the level of voluntary CG disclosure.
Therefore, the next section now considers the evidence and insights from 
previous studies, and subsequently develops the hypotheses of interests.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Previous studies have employed a number of theories, including agency, legit-
imacy, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories4 to examine how corpo-
rate ownership structure and board mechanisms affect (a) general voluntary 
disclosures (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Al-Razeen & 
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Karbhari, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Eng & Mak, 
2003; Rouf, 2011; Taylor, Tower, & Van der Zahn, 2011) and (b) voluntary CG 
disclosures (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2013; Alshehri & 
Solomon, 2012; Y. Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Hussainey 
& Al-Najjar, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 
2016; Piesse et al., 2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Others have examined how 
general firm-specific features, such as size and industry, drive corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) practices (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Fifka, 2013), 
while a limited number of studies have investigated how ownership and board 
mechanisms affect CSR disclosures (Jamali, Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Reverte, 2009).
Hence, and relying on insights from agency, legitimacy, resource depen-
dence, and stakeholder theories, this study draws from these strands of the 
literature, supplemented by the implications of the Saudi context, to identify 
potential ownership and board mechanisms that might affect the voluntary 
disclosure of CG practices. Specifically, the study examines how corporate 
(a) ownership mechanisms (block ownership, government ownership, and 
institutional ownership) and (b) board mechanisms (board size, the presence 
of a CG committee, and audit firm size)5 affect voluntary disclosure of rec-
ommended good CG practices.
Corporate Ownership Structure Mechanisms
Block ownership and CG disclosure. From an agency theory perspective, closer 
managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry that is usually 
associated with block ownership can be expected to minimize agency prob-
lems and improve financial performance (Botosan, 1997; Jensen, 1993; Jen-
sen & Meckling, 1976), and hence a lesser need for increased CG disclosures 
to gain legitimacy (legitimacy theory) from powerful corporate stakeholders 
(stakeholder theory), such as creditors, employee unions, government, and 
shareholders, whose resources (resource dependence), for example, finance, 
contacts and contracts, are arguably critical to the ability of any corporation 
to maintain sustainable operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Rob-
erts, 2010). Thus, in this case, block ownership can serve as a substitute for 
good governance arrangements, including less disclosure relating to CG 
practices (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). In contrast, disperse ownership requires 
greater monitoring, which can be minimized through increased corporate dis-
closures (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b).
In line with the results of past empirical studies (Abdelsalam & Street, 
2007; Barako et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 
2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012; Patel, Balic, & Bwakira, 
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2002; Reverte, 2009), Alsaeed (2006) reports a negative link between block 
ownership and voluntary disclosure for a 2003 cross-sectional sample of 40 
Saudi listed corporations, whereas using a 2009 cross-sectional sample of 100 
Egyptian corporations, Samaha et al. (2012) find that corporations with lower 
block ownership have higher levels of CG disclosure. Similarly, using a 2002 
cross-sectional sample of 244 Canadian listed firms, Bozec and Bozec (2007) 
report a negative link between ownership concentration and disclosure of 
good CG practices. In addition, using a sample of 100 South African listed 
firms from 2002 to 2009, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b) and Ntim 
et al. (2013) report a negative effect of block ownership on voluntary CSR and 
risk disclosures, respectively. Within the Saudi context, corporate ownership 
has historically been concentrated with control firmly in the hands of domi-
nant royal families and government (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Piesse 
et al., 2012), and hence our prediction is that block ownership is more likely 
to affect voluntary CG disclosure. Thus, the study’s first hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a statistically significant negative association 
between block ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and dis-
closure of good CG practices.
Institutional ownership and CG disclosure. Agency theory suggests that due to 
their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders, as influential corpo-
rate stakeholders (stakeholder theory), have extra incentive to closely moni-
tor corporate disclosures (Core, 2001; Fung & Tsai, 2012; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, managers will be expected to not only make more disclo-
sures, including CG practices to meet the informational needs of institutional 
shareholders as powerful (stakeholder theory) corporate stakeholders 
(Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005), but also secure their support to legitimize 
(legitimacy theory) or justify their continued stewardship of the company and 
its critical resources (resource dependence theory; Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010).
Empirically, and consistent with the findings of past evidence (Barako 
et al., 2006; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & 
Thomas, 2012), both Hooghiemstra (2012), and Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) 
report a positive association between institutional ownership and voluntary 
CG disclosure in samples of 85 Dutch and 300 U.K.-listed corporations, 
respectively. Similarly, Fung and Tsai (2012) report that U.S. firms with high 
institutional ownership tend to have better performance and improved CG 
practices. Within the Saudi context, and although institutional ownership has 
traditionally been relatively low (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 
2012), the CMA has been keen on boosting shareholdings by institutions as 
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part of the broader efforts at improving CG standards in Saudi companies 
(IFC, 2008; SFG, 2009). Also, the Saudi CG Code urges institutional share-
holders to actively seek to enhance governance, performance, and disclosure 
practices in Saudi companies, and thus the study’s second hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a statistically significant positive association 
between institutional ownership and the level of voluntary compliance 
and disclosure of good CG practices.
Government ownership and CG disclosure. As a powerful stakeholder (stake-
holder theory) and given the Saudi government’s (through the CMA) formal 
support for the recommendations of Saudi CG Code (Alshehri & Solomon, 
2012; CMA, 2006), our expectation is that Saudi companies with high gov-
ernment ownership will actively seek to win government support (Deegan, 
2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b) by complying with the Code’s 
provisions through increased disclosure of CG practices that may not only 
help in legitimizing (legitimacy theory) their operations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990), but also secure access to critical resources (resource dependence the-
ory; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009), such as finance that can 
enhance performance. Also, agency theory suggests that increased disclosure 
of CG practices can help resolve agency problems between managers and 
government as an influential shareholder (Core, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Furthermore, potential political interference and conflict of interests’ 
problems between shareholders and government that is often associated with 
government ownership can be minimized through increased voluntary disclo-
sure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b).
Prior evidence relating to the connection between government ownership 
and voluntary disclosure is limited, although Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find that government ownership is positively associ-
ated with voluntary disclosure, while Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b) 
and Ntim et al. (2013) report that government ownership affects positively on 
voluntary CSR and risk disclosures, respectively. With regard to the Saudi 
corporate setting, the government holds significant ownership stakes in large 
public and private corporations through a number of institutions, including 
the General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI), Public Investment 
Fund (PIF), and Public Pension Agency (PPA) with keen interest in CG and 
stakeholder issues, and thus, the study’s third hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a statistically significant positive association 
between government ownership and the level of voluntary compliance 
and disclosure of good CG practices.
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Corporate Board Mechanisms
Corporate board size and CG disclosure. Agency theory suggests that increased 
managerial monitoring associated with larger boards can have a positive 
influence on corporate disclosures, including CG practices and performance 
(Samaha et al., 2012), whereas others have suggested that larger boards are 
often characterized by poor coordination, communication, and monitoring 
problems (Jensen, 1993; Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015; Ntim, Opong, 
& Danbolt; 2015), which can impact negatively on CG disclosure and finan-
cial performance. Also, resource dependence theory indicates that larger 
boards are associated with greater diversity in terms of expertise (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010), experience, and stakeholder (stake-
holder theory) representation (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Reverte, 
2009), which can enhance corporate legitimacy (legitimacy theory) and repu-
tation (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).
Despite the mixed theoretical predictions, a number of empirical studies 
report a positive connection between board size and voluntary disclosure 
(Barako et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, 
Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012). For example, both Rouf (2011) and Samaha et al. 
(2012) find that board size is positively related to voluntary disclosure in a 
sample of 120 and 100 Bangladeshi and Egyptian listed corporations, respec-
tively. Similarly, and employing a sample of 100 South African listed firms 
from 2002 to 2009, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b) and Ntim et al. 
(2013) report that board size has a positive effect on voluntary CSR and risk 
disclosures, respectively. In addition, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) report a positive 
link between board size and voluntary disclosure in a sample of 87 Saudi 
listed firms. Also, the Saudi CG Code specifies that board size should be 
between 3 and 11, indicating that it considers board size as an important CG 
mechanism. Given the mixed theoretical literature, however, the study’s 
fourth hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a statistically significant association between 
board size and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good 
CG practices.
Audit firm size (auditor quality) and CG disclosure. The appointment of external 
auditors to examine company accounts is an important governance mecha-
nism for monitoring managers to reduce agency conflicts in modern corpora-
tions, whereby ownership is separate from control (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; 
Han, Kang, & Yoo, 2012). One way of determining external auditor quality is 
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the level of disclosure, and in fact, audit firm size has been suggested to have 
a positive effect on corporate disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998) and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). This is because larger audit firms 
have greater financial strength, experience, expertise, information, and 
knowledge (DeAngelo, 1981; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, 
Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012), which can improve their independence and abil-
ity to limit opportunistic activities of managers (Alsaeed, 2006; Aly, Simon, 
& Hussainey, 2010).
Empirically, a number of studies have reported a positive connection 
between audit firm size and corporate disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Han 
et al., 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Of 
direct relevance to our study, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) report a positive associa-
tion between audit firm quality/size and voluntary disclosure using a sample 
of 87 Saudi listed firms. Also, the Saudi CG Code recognizes external auditors 
as one of the key stakeholders in ensuring that Saudi corporations voluntarily 
comply with its CG provisions. Therefore, the study’s fifth hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 5 (H5): There is a statistically significant positive association 
between audit firm size and the level of voluntary compliance and disclo-
sure of good CG practices.
The presence of a CG committee and CG disclosure. The Saudi CG Code does 
not require Saudi corporations to set up CG committees to continuously mon-
itor compliance with its CG provisions. Therefore, our expectation is that 
Saudi listed corporations that voluntarily establish CG committees to specifi-
cally monitor their compliance are more likely to engage in good CG prac-
tices and disclose more than those that do not have CG committees (Core, 
2001; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012). There is a general lack of 
studies that investigate the link between the presence of a CG committee and 
corporate disclosure, and this is particularly acute in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
where there is also a clear dearth of voluntary CG disclosure studies. The 
only exceptions are studies by Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, and Thomas (2012), 
Ntim et al. (2013), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a). Using a sample of 169 
South African listed corporations from 2002 to 2006, Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, 
and Thomas (2012) report a positive connection between the presence of a 
CG committee and voluntary CG disclosure, and thus the study’s sixth 
hypothesis is that
Hypothesis 6 (H6): There is a statistically significant positive association 
between the presence of a CG committee and the level of voluntary com-
pliance and disclosure of good CG practices.
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Data and Research Method
Data: Sample Selection, Sources, and Description
The sample for the study is drawn from all 145 corporations listed on the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul, 2012) as at the end of 2010, and Table 1 
contains a summary of the sample selection procedure. Panel A of Table 1 
contains the industrial composition of all the corporations that were listed on 
the “Tadawul,” while Panel B of Table 1 contains the final sampled corpora-
tion with full data.
Board mechanisms, ownership structure, and voluntary CG disclosures 
were extracted from the sampled corporations’ annual reports that were 
Table 1. Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure.
No. in each 
industry
Percentage of 
sample
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the “Tadawul” available to be 
sampled as of December 31, 2010
 Basic materials 14 9.66
 Consumer goods 27 18.62
 Consumer services 31 21.38
 Financials 42 28.97
 Industrials 25 17.24
 Telecommunications 4 2.76
 Utilities 2 1.38
 Total firms available to be sampled 145 100.0
  Less: Suspended and merged firms 4  
  Firms with no yearly data available 34  
  Firms listed recently (2009 to 2010) 27  
Total excluded firms 65 44.8
Final selected sample 80 55.2
Panel B: Industrial composition of sampled firms with full data
 Basic materials 8 10.00
 Consumer goods 11 13.75
 Consumer services 22 27.50
 Financials 11 13.75
 Industrials 23 28.75
 Telecommunications 3 3.75
 Utilities 2 2.50
 Final selected sample 80 100.0
Source. The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul, 2012).
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downloaded from the “Tadawul” Website/Perfect Information Database, 
whereas the accounting/financial variables were obtained from “Tadawul” and 
DataStream. To be included in the study’s final sample, a corporation had to 
meet two main criteria: accessibility to a corporation’s complete 7-year annual 
reports from 2004 to 2010 inclusive and the accessibility to a corporation’s 
corresponding accounting/financial data for the same period. The criteria 
were set for several reasons. First, and in line with past studies (Barako et al., 
2006; Eng & Mak, 2003; Henry, 2008), the criteria helped in meeting the 
requirements for a balanced panel data analysis, whose benefits have been 
widely articulated (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009). Third, the sample starts 
in 2004 because data coverage on the “Tadawul” Website/Perfect Information 
Database/DataStream on Saudi listed corporations is very limited prior to 
2004. Starting from 2004 also allows the authors to examine CG standards in 
Saudi corporations pre- and post-2006 CG reforms. The sample ends in 2010 
because it is the most recent year for which data are available. As presented 
in Panel B of Table 1, and after excluding firms that had been suspended, 
merged, newly listed, and with no/missing data, the complete data needed are 
obtained for a total of 80 firms for seven firm-years and seven industries in 
the study’s analysis.
Research Method: Definition of Variables and Model 
Specification
We classify the study’s variables into three main types and Table 2 contains 
full definitions of all them. First, and to test H1 to H6, the study’s main 
dependent variable is the binary6 SCGI, which contains 65 CG provisions. 
The detailed provisions are presented in the appendix. The SCGI seeks to 
measure the extent to which Saudi listed corporations voluntarily disclose 
information on their CG practices based on four broad areas specified by the 
2006 Saudi CG Code, consisting of (a) BOD, (b) DAT, (c) IRM, and (d) ROS.
Second, and to test H1 to H6, the authors collected data on ownership 
structures, including block ownership (BONR), government ownership 
(GONR), and institutional ownership (IONR), and on board mechanisms, 
including board size (BSZ), audit firm quality/size (AFZ), and the presence 
of a CG committee (CGC). Finally, and to control for potential omitted vari-
ables bias (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009), the authors included an extensive 
number of control variables. These include capital expenditure (CEXC), divi-
dend payment status (DV), leverage (LVG), firm size (FSZ), sales growth 
(SGR), industry dummy (INDU), and year dummy (YDU). For brevity, the 
authors do not develop direct theoretical connections between these control vari-
ables and voluntary disclosure of CG practices, but there is extensive theoretical 
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Table 2. Summary Definition of Variables.
Dependent variables
 SCGI CG compliance and disclosure index consisting of 65 provisions from the 
Saudi CG Code that takes a value of 1 if each of the 65 CG provisions is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%
 BOD Subindex of SCGI related to the board of directors consisting of 35 
provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 35 CG provisions is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%
 DAT Subindex of SCGI related to disclosure and transparency consisting of 
16 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 16 CG provisions is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%
 IRM Subindex of SCGI related to internal control and risk management consisting 
of 6 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 6 CG provisions is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%
 ROS Subindex of SCGI related to rights of shareholders and General Assembly 
consisting of 8 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 8 CG 
provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0%  
and 100%
 ROA Percentage of operating profit to total assets value and RISK is the standard 
deviation of ROA
Independent variables
 AFZ 1, if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte 
& Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise
 BONR% Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total 
company shareholdings
 BSZ The total number of directors on the board of a company
 CGC 1, if a firm has set up a CG committee, 0 otherwise
 GONR% Percentage of government ownership to total company ordinary 
shareholdings
 IONR% Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders
Control variables
 DV 1, if a firm paid dividends during the financial year, 0 otherwise.
 FSZ Natural log of the book value of a firm’s total assets value
 INDU Dummies for each of the 8 main industries: banks and financial, services, 
building and construction, agriculture, petrochemical, industrials/
manufacturing, cement, and others
 LVG% Percentage of total debt to total assets value
 CEXC% Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets value
 SGR% Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous 
year’s sales
 YDU Dummies for each of the 7 years from 2004 to 2010 inclusive
Note. SCGI = Saudi corporate governance disclosure index; CG = corporate governance; BOD = board of 
directors; DAT = disclosure and transparency; IRM = internal control and risk management; ROS = rights 
of shareholders and the general assembly; ROA = return on assets; RISK = financial risk; AFZ = audit firm 
size; BONR = block ownership; BSZ = board size; CGC = corporate governance committee; GONR = 
government ownership; IONR = institutional ownership; DV = dividend payment status; FSZ = firm size; 
INDU = industry dummy; LVG = leverage; CEXC = capital expenditure; SGR = sales growth; YDU = year 
dummy.
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and empirical literature that suggests they can potentially affect voluntary CG 
disclosure (SCGI) (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aly 
et al., 2010; Botosan, 1997; Y. Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Fifka, 2013; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Rouf, 2011; Samaha 
et al., 2012).
Assuming that all relationships are linear, the study’s main ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression equation to be estimated to test H1 to H6 is specified 
as follows:
SCGI BONR IONR GONR BSZ AFZ
CGC
it it it it it it
B
= + + + + +
+
α β β β β β0 1 2 3 4 5
6 it i
i
n
it it+ +
=
∑β ε
1
CONTROLS
 (1)
where the variables are defined as follows: Saudi CG disclosure index 
(SCGI), block ownership (BONR), institutional ownership (IONR), govern-
ment ownership (GONR), board size (BSZ), audit firm quality/size (AFZ), 
and the presence of a CG committee (CGC), and CONTROLS refers to all 
the control variables, including dividend payment status (DV), sales growth 
(SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC), leverage (LVG), firm size (FSZ), 7 
industry dummies (INDUs), and 7 year dummies (YDUs).
The authors discuss the empirical results, including descriptive statistics 
and regression analyses, in the following section.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Empirical Results From Descriptive Statistics and Univariate 
Regression Analyses
Table 3 presents the summary descriptive statistics relating to the level of com-
pliance with the SCGI (see Panel A of Table 3) and their subindices for the 
pooled sample, as well as for each of the 7 firm-years examined. First, the sum-
mary descriptive statistics suggest that there is substantial degree of dispersion 
in the distribution of the SCGI. For example, the SCGI ranges from a minimum 
of 3.08% to a maximum of 90.77% with the average (median) corporation 
complying with 44.61% (44.62%) of the 65 CG provisions investigated. 
Second, and in line with the findings of previous studies (Barako et al., 2006; 
Henry, 2008; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2016; Patel et al., 2002), the results in 
Table 3 suggest that compliance with the SCGI provisions generally improves 
over time, with the median (average) aggregate compliance levels increasing 
consistently from 17.08% (16.92%) in 2004 to 73.15% (73.85%) in 2010, a 
56.07 (56.93) percentage point increase over the 7 firm-year period examined.
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Third, the authors observe similar widespread and continuous improvements 
in the distributions of the four subindices. For example, the BOD ranges from 0% 
(0%) to 94.29% with the average (median) corporation complying with 37.30% 
(34.29%) of the 35 BOD provisions examined. By contrast, disclosures relating 
to IRM are lowest with a minimum (maximum) of 0.00% (50.00%) with the 
average (median) firm complying with 26.40% (0.00%) of the 6 IRM provisions. 
Fourth, the student t test of differences between pre- and post-2006 means/medi-
ans indicates that the levels of compliance and disclosure are significantly higher 
over the post-2006 period than over the pre-2006 period for both the summary 
SCGI and its four subindices (BOD, DAT, IRM, and ROS). This suggests that, on 
average, the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG code has helped in improving 
disclosure and CG standards among Saudi listed corporations.
Finally and in summary, the main evidence that emerges from investigating 
the complete sample of corporations is that despite the expectation that the 
introduction of the Saudi CG Code would speed-up convergence of CG prac-
tices (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; CMA, 2006; IFC, 2008), CG standards 
among Saudi listed corporations still differ substantially. Whereas this is gen-
erally in line with the variability in compliance levels reported by previous CG 
disclosure studies (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Y. Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Hussainey 
& Al-Najjar, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012), it sug-
gests that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the impor-
tance that Saudi listed corporations attach to CG. Evidence of improving CG 
standards among the sampled corporations, however, implies that contrary to 
general concerns as to whether the Saudi CG code can help improve CG stan-
dards in Saudi firms given contextual challenges (Piesse et al., 2012; 
Safieddine, 2009; SFG, 2009), the current voluntary compliance and disclo-
sure regime has had a positive effect on CG standards in Saudi listed firms.
Table 4 reports summary statistics relating to the independent and control 
variables used. In addition, the summary statistics relating to the SCGI and its 
components are also repeated in Table 4 from Table 3 for the sake of com-
pleteness. Similar to the SCGI, the distribution of all the independent and 
control variables generally display wide variations. For example, return on 
assets (ROA) ranges from a minimum of 3.93% to a maximum of 23.93% 
with mean (median) of 6.76% (4.88%), suggesting that the average Saudi 
listed firm was profitable over the period analyzed. Similarly, board size 
(BSZ) ranges from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 12 with a median (mean) 
of 9 (8.42) board members. This compares well with the findings of previous 
studies relating to the distribution of corporate board size (Barako et al., 2006; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012). For instance, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report an 
average board size of 10 for a sample of Malaysian listed firms. In line with 
the findings of past studies (Alsaeed, 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Piesse 
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et al., 2012; Soliman, 2013a, 2013b), BONR is between a minimum of 0.00% 
(i.e., no block owners) and a maximum of 85.21% with a mean (median) of 
61.96% (62.00%), suggesting that Saudi firms ownership structure is 
Table 4. Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent, Independent, and 
Control Variables for All (560) Firm Years.
Variables M Median SD Minimum Maximum
Pre- and  
post-2006 mean/
median differences
Mean 
difference
Median 
difference
Dependent variables
 SCGI (%) 44.61 44.62 22.33 3.08 90.77 24.575*** 21.232***
 BOD (%) 37.30 34.29 27.31 0.00 94.29 21.210*** 23.001***
 DAT (%) 54.93 56.25 25.60 6.25 100.00 25.216*** 24.209***
 IRM (%) 26.40 0.00 25.03 0.00 100.00 15.544*** 11.816***
 ROS (%) 69.60 75.00 11.85 12.50 87.50 7.508*** 9.398***
 ROA (%) 6.76 4.88 7.16 −3.93 23.93 46.230*** 50.919***
 RISK (%) 1.59 1.13 1.40 0.16 4.97 65.112*** 66.801***
Independent variables
 AFZ 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.132 0.152
 BONR (%) 61.96 62.00 24.83 0.00 85.21 0.929 1.052
 BSZ 8.42 9.00 1.76 4.00 13.00 0.856 0.732
 CGC 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.438*** 0.487***
 GONR (%) 42.17 42.22 19.69 0.00 83.69 0.0919 0.933
 IONR (%) 6.98 7.00 11.03 0.00 40.00 0.0537 0.465
Control variables
 DV 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.783 0.698
 FSZ 21.42 21.36 8.84 18.61 25.53 2.315** 2.221**
 SGR (%) 14.54 9.32 29.62 −37.62 89.66 −2.832*** −2.566***
 LVG (%) 21.46 8.85 27.27 0.00 84.15 1.622 2.001
 CEXC (%) 8.57 5.87 8.25 0.11 28.83 −0.915 −0.883
Note. Variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (SCGI), 
board and directors subindex (BOD), disclosure and transparency subindex (DAT), internal 
control and risk management subindex (IRM), rights of shareholders and the general assembly 
subindex (ROS), return on assets (ROA), and financial risk (RISK), audit firm size (AFZ), block 
ownership (BONR), board size (BSZ), the presence of a corporate governance committee 
(CGC), government ownership (GONR), institutional ownership (IONR), capital expenditure 
(CEXC), dividend payment status (DV), firm size (FSZ), leverage (LVG), capital expenditure 
(CEXC), and sales growth (SGR). The last two columns present the pre-2006 (i.e., 2004 and 
2005) and post-2006 (2006 to 2010) mean/median differences for the variables with *** and 
** indicating the student t test of the mean/median difference between pre-2006 and post-
2006 subsample is significant at the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively.
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relatively highly concentrated. The figures for the CG indices (SCGI, BOD, 
DAT, IRM, and ROS), AFZ, CGC, GONR, and IONR, as well as the control 
variables in Table 4 suggest substantial variation in our sample, and thus 
reducing any possibilities of sample selection bias.
Observably, the student t test of the differences in means/medians of pre-
2006 and post-2006 suggests that significantly more CG committees were 
voluntarily set up by Saudi listed firms in the post-2006 period to specifically 
monitor voluntary disclosure of CG practices than in the pre-2006 period. 
This seems to explain the observed significantly higher levels of compliance 
and disclosure of CG practices in the post-2006 period compared with the 
pre-2006 period, and implying generally that the presence of a CG committee 
impacts positively on voluntary disclosure of CG practices. In addition, the 
significantly positive and negative student t test for FSZ and SGR, respec-
tively, indicate that Saudi firms have become relatively larger in terms of 
total asset value, while their growth has been significantly slower in the post-
2006 period compared with the pre-2006 period, which may be explained by 
the negative effects of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.
The authors use OLS regression technique to test all our six hypotheses, 
and thus it is appropriate to initially examine a number of OLS assumptions, 
including multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and 
linearity. Table 5 reports the correlation matrix for all variables used in the 
study’s analysis to test for multicollinearity. As robustness check, both the 
Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients are reported 
and, observably, the magnitude and direction of both coefficients are very 
similar, indicating that no major non-normalities remain. Both matrices sug-
gest further that correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that 
no serious multicollinearities exist. In addition, the authors investigated (for 
brevity not reported here, but available on request) scatter plots for P-P and 
Q-Q, studentized residuals, Cook’s distances and Durbin–Watson statistic for 
homoscedasticity, linearity, normality, and autocorrelation, respectively, with 
the tests suggesting no serious violation of these OLS assumptions.
Table 5 indicates statistically significant connections between the SCGI and 
the explanatory variables, and also between the SCGI and the control variables. 
For example, and as hypothesized, AFZ, BSZ, CGC, and GONR are statisti-
cally significant and positively associated with the SCGI, whereas BONR is 
statistically significant and negatively related to the SCGI. Observably, IONR 
is statistically insignificant, but positively associated with the SCGI.
With reference to the control variables, the findings suggest that larger 
(FSZ), highly geared (LVG), and dividend paying (DV) corporations make 
significantly more voluntary CG disclosures, whereas growing (SGR) corpo-
rations make significantly less voluntary CG disclosures. There is, however, 
no evidence to suggest that more capital intensive (CEXC) Saudi 
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corporations make significantly less or more voluntary CG disclosures than 
their less capital intensive counterparts.
Empirical Results From Multivariate Regression Analyses
Table 6 reports the results of the regression analyses of the effects of corporate 
ownership and board mechanisms on the extent of voluntary CG disclosures. 
Models 1, 2, and 3 report the results of a pooled OLS regression of the owner-
ship, board mechanisms, and both ownership and board mechanisms along with 
the control variables on the SCGI (Saudi CG index), respectively. The results 
contained in Model 3, which is the study’s main model, generally indicate that 
the independent variables (ownership and board mechanisms) are significant in 
explaining cross-sectional differences in the voluntary CG disclosures.
First, the study’s results indicate that the coefficients on GONR, IONR, 
AFZ, BSZ, and CGC are statistically significant and positively related to the 
SCGI, implying that Saudi corporations with high GONR, IONR, AFZ, BSZ, 
and CGC generally make significantly more voluntary CG disclosures.
The results in Model 3 of Table 6 suggest that BONR is statistically sig-
nificant and negatively related to the SCGI, implying that Saudi corporations 
with block ownership disclose less on their CG practices. This finding offers 
empirical support for our multitheoretical framework, which suggests that 
closer managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry that is usu-
ally associated with block ownership can be expected to minimize agency 
problems (agency theory) and improve financial performance (Botosan, 
1997; Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and hence a lesser need for 
increased CG disclosures to gain legitimacy (legitimacy theory) from power-
ful corporate stakeholders (stakeholder theory), such as creditors, employee 
unions, government, and shareholders, whose resources (resource depen-
dence), for example, finance, contacts and contracts, are arguably critical to 
the ability of any corporation to maintain sustainable operations (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010). Thus, in this case, block ownership 
can serve as a substitute for good governance arrangements, including less 
disclosure relating to CG practices (Y. Bozec & Bozec, 2007). In contrast, 
disperse ownership requires greater monitoring, which can be minimized 
through increased corporate disclosures (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b). This also supports H1 and the findings of past 
studies, which suggest that BONR affects negatively on voluntary CG and 
CSR disclosures (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Alsaeed, 2006; Y. Bozec & 
Bozec, 2007; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & 
Thomas, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Patel et al., 2002), but is 
not in line with the results of those that report a positive link between BONR 
and voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
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In addition, the economic importance of this finding is that a one standard 
deviation change (decrease) in BONR may lead to about 2.81% (i.e., 24.83% 
× 0.113) change (i.e., increase) in the level of the SCGI.
Second and by contrast, the positive association between IONR and the 
SCGI provide empirical support for H2 and the findings of past studies that sug-
gest that corporations with high IONR make more voluntary CG and CSR dis-
closures (Barako et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012), 
as well as those that report a positive link between institutional ownership and 
performance (Fung & Tsai, 2012). The findings also offer support for recent 
attempts by the CMA at increasing institutional shareholding as part of the 
broader efforts at improving CG standards in Saudi corporations (IFC, 2008; 
SFG, 2009). Theoretically, the result is largely in line with the predictions of our 
multitheoretical framework that draws on insights from agency, legitimacy, 
resource dependence, and stakeholder theories. For example, agency theory 
suggests that due to their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders, as 
influential corporate stakeholders (stakeholder theory), have extra incentive to 
closely monitor corporate disclosures (Core, 2001; Fung & Tsai, 2012; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, managers will not only be expected to make more 
voluntary disclosures, including CG practices to meet the informational needs of 
institutional shareholders as powerful (stakeholder theory) corporate stakehold-
ers (Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005) but also to secure their support to legitimize 
(legitimacy theory) or justify their continued stewardship of the company and its 
critical resources (resource dependence theory; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; 
Chen & Roberts, 2010). Economically, this finding implies that a one standard 
deviation change (increase) in IONR may be associated with about 2.10% 
(11.03% × 0.190) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI.
The positive connection between GONR and the SCGI provides empirical 
support for H3 and the results of Eng and Mak (2003), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), 
Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, and Thomas (2012), Ntim et al. (2013), and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b) suggest that corporations with high government 
ownership make significantly more voluntary CG and CSR disclosures, as well 
as the broader objectives of government investments. Through the GOSI, PIF, 
and PPA, the Saudi government holds significant ownership stakes in major 
corporations with keen interest in positively influencing CG and stakeholder 
issues. Thus, this finding offers empirical support for our multitheoretical 
framework. Specifically, this finding suggests that as a powerful stakeholder 
(stakeholder theory) and given the Saudi government’s (through the CMA) 
formal support for the recommendations of Saudi CG Code (Alshehri & 
Solomon, 2012; CMA, 2006), Saudi companies with high government own-
ership tend to actively seek to win government support (Deegan, 2002; Ntim 
& Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b) by complying with the Saudi CG Code’s 
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provisions through increased disclosure of CG practices that may not only 
help in legitimizing (legitimacy theory) their operations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; M. C. Unerman, 1995) but also secure access to critical resources 
(resource dependence theory; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009), 
such as finance that can enhance performance. Also, agency theory suggests 
that increased disclosure of CG practices can help resolve agency problems 
between managers and government as an influential shareholder (Core, 2001; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, potential political interference and 
conflict of interests’ problems between shareholders and government that is 
often associated with government ownership can be minimized through 
increased voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013a, 2013b). The economic relevance of this finding is that a one standard 
deviation change (increase) in IONR may be associated with about 3.94% 
(19.69% × 0.20) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI.
Furthermore, the positive coefficients on BSZ, AFZ and CGC indicate that 
H4, H5, and H6, respectively, are supported. The positive relationship between 
BSZ and SCGI is in line with the evidence of previous studies (Al-Janadi et al., 
2013; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 
2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, 
& Thomas, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Rouf, 2011; Samaha 
et al., 2012). Similarly, the evidence that AFZ impacts positively on voluntary 
CG disclosure is consistent with the findings of previous studies (Al-Janadi 
et al., 2013; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), whereas 
the positive effect of CGC on SCGI offers new empirical support for the findings 
of Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, and Thomas (2012), Ntim et al. (2013), and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b). The positive CGC–SCGI nexus is also in line with 
the univariate (see Table 4) and bivariate (see Table 5) evidence, which suggests 
that establishing a CG committee to specifically monitor compliance and disclo-
sure of CG practices can contribute positively toward enhancing CG standards. 
With respect to board size, theoretically, increased managerial monitoring associ-
ated with larger boards can have a positive influence on corporate disclosures, 
including CG ones and performance (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
a similar vein, and with respect to audit firm, larger audit firms have greater finan-
cial strength, knowledge, and independence, which can affect positively on volun-
tary CG disclosure (DeAngelo, 1981; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Economically, the implications of these findings can be 
quantified as, a one standard deviation change (increase) in BSZ, AFZ, and CGC 
may be associated with about 0.40% (1.76 × 0.231), 12.45% (49% × 0.254) and 
9.66% (30% × 0.322) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI, respectively.
Third, the study’s findings so far suggest that cross-sectional differences in 
the SCGI can be explained by the independent variables, but as it contains 
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voluntary CG disclosures from four different categories, it is possible for the 
link between each category and the independent variables to vary, with some 
potentially having strong connections with these variables and others maintain-
ing weak associations. Thus, to examine the link between each voluntary CG 
disclosure subcategory and the independent variables, the authors reestimated 
Equation 1 by replacing the SCGI with the BOD, DAT, IRM, and ROS at a 
time, and the findings are, respectively, presented in Models 4 to 7 of Table 6.
The coefficients on the GONR (except the coefficient on the DAT and 
IRM), IONR (except the coefficient on the BOD, IRM, and ROS), BSZ 
(except the coefficient on the IRM and ROS), AFZ (except the coefficient on 
the DAT and ROS), and CGC (except the coefficient on the BOD, DAT and 
ROS) remain statistically significant and positively related to all four volun-
tary CG disclosure subcategories. Similarly, the coefficient on BONR (except 
the coefficient on the IRM) remains statistically significant and negatively 
associated with all four disclosure subcategories, and thus largely offering 
further empirical support for our previous findings. The observed sensitivi-
ties in the coefficients also reflect the differences in the levels of disclosure 
with respect to the four CG disclosure subcategories that are evident in Table 
3, implying that Saudi corporations differ in terms of the importance that they 
attach to the various sections of the 2006 Saudi CG code.
Finally, the coefficients on the control variables in Table 6 are generally 
consistent with expectations. For example, the coefficients on CEXC, DV, 
FSZ, and SGR are positively associated with the SCGI, whereas the coeffi-
cient on LVG is negatively related to the SCGI. However, the coefficients 
relating to the control variables are not always statistically significant or con-
sistent across the different models.
Additional Analyses
The study carries out additional analyses to investigate the robustness of our 
findings. First, and as previously discussed, our sample period covers the 
2004 to 2010 period. Therefore, to ascertain whether there are differences in 
this study’s results with respect to the period of examination, the authors 
reestimated the study’s regression by splitting the sample into two subsam-
ples: pre-2006 (i.e., from 2004 to 2005) and post-2006 (2006 to 2010) peri-
ods. To facilitate comparison, Model 1 of  Table 7 repeats the main findings 
contained in Model 3 of Table 6. The results reported in Models 2 and 3 for 
the pre-2006 and post-2006 periods, respectively, are generally similar. 
However, the statistical significance of the post-2006 period findings are 
relatively strong compared with that of the pre-2006 period, suggesting that 
the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG Code appears to have helped in 
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improving CG practices, and consequently, a tighter association between vol-
untary CG disclosures and board/ownership mechanisms.
Second and as previously explained, all 65 provisions constituting the 
SCGI are equally weighted, but the number of provisions varies across the 
four sections, resulting in different weights being assigned to each section: 
BOD, 54%; DAT, 25%; IRM, 9%; and ROS, 12%. To ascertain whether the 
study’s results are robust to the weighting of the four sections, the authors 
construct an alternative SCGI, defined as Weighted-SCGI, in which each sec-
tion is awarded equal weight of 25%. Although there are slight changes with 
regard to the magnitude of the coefficients, the study’s results reported in 
Model 4 of Table 7 remain essentially the same as those presented in Model 
3 of Table 6, and thus the study’s general conclusions remain unchanged.
Third, differences in the opportunities and challenges that corporations 
encounter vary over time, implying that voluntary CG disclosure behavior 
may be jointly and dynamically determined by unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics (Henry, 2008), which simple OLS regression may be unable to 
detect (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009). Hence, given the panel nature of the 
study’s data set, the authors run a fixed-effects model to control for possible 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. This involves reestimating Equation 
1, with the introduction of 79 dummies to represent the 80 sampled corpora-
tions. The study’s fixed-effects results reported in Model 5 of Table 7 remain 
largely unaltered, implying that the study’s findings are not sensitive to 
potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.
Finally, to address potential endogeneity problems that may arise from a 
simultaneous relationship between the board/ownership mechanisms and the 
CG disclosures, the authors estimate a lagged structure (i.e., by introducing a 
1-year gap between the CG disclosures and board/ownership mechanisms), 
whereby the current year’s CG disclosures depend on the previous year’s 
board/ownership mechanisms. Similarly, the results reported in Model 6 of 
Table 7 is essentially the same as those contained in Model 1 of the same table, 
suggesting that the study’s findings are generally robust to potential endogene-
ity problems that may arise from the existence of a simultaneous link between 
board/ownership mechanisms and the SCGI. Overall, the evidence emerging 
from the study’s additional analyses make the authors reasonably confident 
that the study’s findings are not driven by any endogenous relationships.
Summary and Conclusion
A number of emerging countries have pursued CG reforms around the world. 
In this vein, Saudi Arabia, a major G-20 country, has also pursued CG reforms 
in the form of the 2006 Saudi CG Code, notably adopting the U.K.-style volun-
tary (“comply or explain”) compliance regime. However, the Saudi corporate 
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context is characterized by a highly hierarchical social structure, concentrated 
ownership, low institutional ownership, and weak enforcement of corporate 
regulations. These have raised critical concerns as to whether a voluntary com-
pliance regime will be effective in improving CG standards. This article has 
investigated whether and to what extent publicly listed Saudi corporations vol-
untarily comply with and disclose recommended good CG practices, and dis-
tinctively, examined whether the observed cross-sectional differences in such 
voluntary CG disclosures can be explained by ownership and board mecha-
nisms. The study used a sample of 80 Saudi listed firms from 2004 to 2010 and 
65 CG provisions based on the 2006 Saudi CG Code for our analysis.
Apart from applying a multitheoretical framework in interpreting the 
study’s findings, the authors make a number of new contributions to the 
extant literature. First, analysis of the levels of compliance with the con-
structed voluntary compliance and disclosure index generally indicates that, 
despite the expectation that the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG Code 
would speed-up convergence of CG practices, CG standards among Saudi 
listed corporations still vary substantially. At the aggregate levels, the scores 
range from a minimum of 3.08% to a maximum of 90.77% with the average 
sampled corporations complying with 44.61% of the 65 CG provisions exam-
ined, as well as the mean CG score increasing from 17.08% in 2004 to 73.15% 
in 2010. Whereas this is line with the variation in compliance levels reported 
by previous studies, it indicates that a high degree of heterogeneity exists 
when it comes to the importance that Saudi listed corporations attach to CG. 
However, despite concerns as to whether a voluntary CG regime will be 
effective given the Saudi corporate setting, the scores indicate that compli-
ance levels and CG standards among the sampled corporations have gener-
ally improved over the 7-year period investigated.
Second, the study’s analysis of the factors driving voluntary compliance 
and disclosure suggests that ownership structure and board mechanisms are 
generally significant in explaining differences in disclosure. Specifically, the 
study’s results suggest that corporations with larger boards, a Big 4 auditor, 
higher government ownership, a CG committee, and higher institutional 
ownership disclose considerably more than those that are not. By contrast, 
the authors find that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces 
voluntary CG disclosure. The study’s results are generally robust to a number 
of econometric models that control for different types of disclosure indices, 
general firm-specific characteristics, and firm-level fixed effects.
Third, the study’s evidence has important implications for policy makers 
and regulators. For example, evidence of increasing compliance with the Saudi 
CG Code implies that efforts by various stakeholders, notably the CMA and 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul, 2012), at improving CG standards in Saudi 
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corporations have had some positive impact on CG practices of Saudi corpora-
tions. However, the large differences in the levels of compliance suggest that 
enforcement may need to be strengthened further. In this vein, establishing a 
“compliance and enforcement committee” to continuously monitor compliance 
levels among listed corporations may be a step in the right direction. Similarly, 
as the presence of institutional shareholders and a Big 4 audit firm is demon-
strated to have a positive effect on good CG practices, it provides the CMA, 
“Tadawul,” and the Saudi government the impetus to encourage greater institu-
tional ownership and a Big 4 auditing of Saudi listed corporations. Also, for 
managers and corporations, our evidence suggests that one way by which they 
can improve their CG standards is to establish a CG committee with the spe-
cific mandate to monitor their firms’ compliance with corporate rules and regu-
lations, especially those relating to good CG practices.
Finally, while the study’s evidence is important and robust, some caveats 
are considered appropriate. We employ a binary scoring scheme, which treats 
every CG disclosure as equally important. While findings based on the 
study’s unweighted and weighted indices are essentially the same, future 
studies may improve their analysis by constructing weighted and unweighted 
voluntary CG disclosure indices. Similarly, as a result of data limitations, the 
study’s analysis is limited to a number of factors that can influence voluntary 
CG disclosure. As data availability improves, future studies may need to 
investigate how other potential factors, such as foreign ownership and the 
number of analysts, influence voluntary CG disclosure. Furthermore, the 
authors collected the study’s data from corporate annual reports to conduct 
quantitative analyses. However, annual reports can sometimes convey mixed 
messages. Therefore, future studies may improve on the study’s evidence by 
employing qualitative approaches, such as conducting face-to-face interviews 
and case studies with relevant stakeholders, such as auditors, company direc-
tors, the CMA, investors, and “Tadawul.” This may provide a holistic under-
standing of the different determinants of, and motives for, voluntary CG 
disclosures. Furthermore, the authors note that because a considerable number 
of popular corporate board mechanisms, such as CEO role duality, frequency 
of board meetings, the proportion of independent non-executive directors, the 
presence of board subcommittees (e.g., audit, nomination, and remuneration 
committees), and executive compensation information are contained in the 
Saudi CG Code (see the appendix), the authors are unable to include them as 
part of the potential factors that can explain observable cross-sectional differ-
ences in the level of voluntary disclosure of recommended CG practices. The 
study’s analyses are, therefore, limited to corporate board factors (e.g., board 
size) and other CG mechanisms (e.g., audit firm size and the presence of a CG 
committee), which are not already contained in the Saudi CG index. Future 
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Appendix
Full List of the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (SCGI) 
Provisions Based on the 2006 Saudi Corporate Governance Code
Corporate governance (CG) disclosure index (SCGI)
SCGI theme SCGI Item: Information on or reference to
Range of 
scores
Total score 
per item
i.  Board of 
directors
Board of directors and composition 35
 1.  Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are 
split
0-1
 2.  Whether the chairperson is an independent non-
executive director (NED)
0-1
 3.  Whether the board is composed by a majority of 
NEDs
0-1
 4.  Whether directors are clearly classified into 
executive directors, NEDs, and independent NEDs
0-1
 5.  Whether at least 1/3 of the board are independent 
NEDs
0-1
 6.  Whether directors’ membership on boards of other 
firm’s are disclosed
0-1
 7.  Whether members of the board do not hold 
directorships on more than five other listed firms
0-1
 8.  Whether the board of directors’ meetings record is 
disclosed.
0-1
 9.  Whether individual director’s meeting attendance 
record is disclosed
0-1
10.  Whether directors’ biography, qualifications, 
experience and responsibilities are disclosed
0-1
Audit committee
11.  Whether the committee has been established 0-1
12.  Whether the committee’s remit/terms of reference 
is disclosed
0-1
13.  Whether the committee is composed entirely by at 
least 3 NEDs
0-1
14.  Whether at least a member of the committee is 
literate in financial and accounting matters, such as 
being a chartered certified accountant
0-1
15.  Whether the chairperson of the committee is 
disclosed
0-1
16.  Whether the chairperson of the committee is an 
independent NED
0-1
17.  Whether members of the committee is disclosed 0-1
18.  Whether the committee’s meetings record is 
disclosed
0-1
19.  Whether the individual members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed
0-1
Nomination committee
20.   Whether the committee has been established 0-1
21.   Whether the committee’s remit/terms of reference 
is disclosed
0-1
 (continued)
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Corporate governance (CG) disclosure index (SCGI)
SCGI theme SCGI Item: Information on or reference to
Range of 
scores
Total score 
per item
22.   Whether the committee consists of a majority of 
independent NEDs
0-1
23.   Whether the chairperson of the committee is 
disclosed
0-1
24.   Whether the chairperson of the committee is an 
independent NED
0-1
25.   Whether the members of the committee is 
disclosed
0-1
26.   Whether the committee’s meetings record is 
disclosed
0-1
27.   Whether the individual members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed
0-1
Remuneration committee  
28.   Whether the committee has been established 0-1
29.   Whether the committee’s remit/terms of reference 
is disclosed
0-1
30.   Whether the committee is composed entirely by 
independent NEDs
0-1
31.   Whether the chairperson of the committee is 
disclosed.
0-1
32.   Whether the chairperson of the committee is an 
independent NED
0-1
33.   Whether the members of the committee is 
disclosed
0-1
34.   Whether the committee’s meetings record is 
disclosed
0-1
35.   Whether the individual members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed
0-1
ii.  Disclosure 
and 
transparency
36.   Whether the firm’s ownership structure is disclosed 0-1 16
37.   Whether the firm’s directors own at least 1,000 of 
the firm’s shares
0-1
38.   Whether the details of compensation paid to 
directors are disclosed
0-1
39.   Whether board’s total value of annual compensation 
of each director equals or is less than US$53,000 or 
10% of firms’ profit
0-1
40.   Whether the details of the CEO’s compensation are 
disclosed
0-1
41.   Whether the details of top management’s 
compensation are disclosed
0-1
42.   Whether a review of the firm’s operations and 
performance is disclosed
0-1
43.  Whether the details of firm’s debt/loans are disclosed 0-1
44.  Whether a firm’s 5-year financial performance is 
compared/disclosed
0-1
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Corporate governance (CG) disclosure index (SCGI)
SCGI theme SCGI Item: Information on or reference to
Range of 
scores
Total score 
per item
45.  Whether a firm’s strategies and objectives are 
disclosed
0-1
46.  Whether the principal activities of the firm are 
disclosed
0-1
47. Whether a firm’s dividend policy is disclosed 0-1
48.  Whether a firm discloses any related party 
transactions
0-1
49.  Whether a firm has been penalized for breaking 
corporate regulations by a supervisory body, such as 
the Tadawul and Capital Market Authority
0-1
50.  Whether a board statement on the going-concern 
status of the firm is disclosed
0-1
51.  Whether a narrative regarding compliance/non-
compliance with the Saudi CG code is provided
0-1
iii.  Internal 
control 
and risk 
management
52.   Whether an audit report regarding the effectiveness 
of internal control system is disclosed
0-1 6
53.   Whether the firm’s risk management policy, 
philosophy and procedures are disclosed
0-1
54.   Whether the major risks facing the firm are 
disclosed
0-1
55.   Whether a statement to the effect that the financial 
reports have been approved by the board of 
directors, CEO and chief financial officer (CFO) is 
disclosed.
0-1
56.   Whether the board of directors provides a 
statement regarding consistent application of 
generally accepted accounting principles
0-1
57.   Whether the firm has drafted a corporate 
governance code
0-1
iv. Rights of 
shareholders 
and the GA
58.   Whether a narrative regarding fact that the general 
assembly (GA) is held at least once a year is 
disclosed
0-1 8
59.   Whether a narrative regarding the fact the agenda 
for a firm’s GA meeting had been announced on the 
Tadawul website is disclosed
0-1
60.   Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the 
firm’s shareholders have the right to vote by proxy 
is disclosed
0-1
61.   Whether a narrative regarding the fact the firm 
operates a one-vote-one-share policy is disclosed
0-1
62.   Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm 
announces a GA meeting at least 20 days prior to 
the date of the meeting is disclosed
0-1
63.   Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm 
immediately informs the stock exchange through 
the Tadawul website about the outcome of the GA 
meeting is disclosed
0-1
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studies may, therefore, enhance the insights that they offer by examining the 
extent to which these factors may influence voluntary CG disclosure.
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Notes
1. The authors will like to clarify the use of a number of terminologies, including 
“voluntary disclosure,” “good CG practices,” “board mechanisms,” and “own-
ership structures” that are frequently referred to in this study. First, “voluntary 
disclosure” refers to the voluntary corporate governance (CG) compliance and 
disclosure regime of “comply or explain” which offers directors and managers 
the option to comply and disclose their CG mechanisms or explain why they have 
not been able to comply with specific CG provisions contained in the 2006 Saudi 
CG Code. In this case, the U.K.-style “voluntary compliance and disclosure” 
Corporate governance (CG) disclosure index (SCGI)
SCGI theme SCGI Item: Information on or reference to
Range of 
scores
Total score 
per item
64.   Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the GA 
convenes within 6 months following the end of the 
firm’s financial year is disclosed
0-1
65.   Whether the firm discloses its social contributions. 0-1
Total 65 SCGI Items 65
Scoring 
procedure
 
0 = If a particular corporate governance item is not disclosed
1 = If a particular corporate governance item is disclosed
Appendix (continued)
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regime can be contrasted with the U.S.-style mandatory regime of “comply or 
else,” which explicitly mandates firms to comply with specific CG provisions, 
such as those contained in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) or else face specified 
penalty or prosecution. Second, “good CG practices” refer to best practice rec-
ommendations relating to CG that are contained in the 2006 Saudi CG Code that 
Saudi listed corporations are expected to comply with or explain why they have 
not been able to comply with in their annual reports. Third, “board mechanisms” 
refer to CG structures relating to corporate boards, including board size, compo-
sition and the presence of a CG committee. Finally, “ownership structures” refer 
to ordinary shareholdings by block shareholders (holding 5% or more of a com-
pany’s ordinary shares), who may be individuals, governments and institutions.
2. The Capital Market Authority (CMA) prohibits foreigners whether individu-
als or institutions from participating in the market. Following the 2006 market 
crash, however, the CMA has been keen on boosting foreign participation, and 
in August 2008, the CMA granted non-resident and non-Arab foreign investors 
the opportunity to indirectly buy Saudi shares through swap arrangements for the 
first time (Samba Financial Group [SFG], 2009, p. 6). The operation of the swap 
arrangements involves a process, whereby a CMA-approved and licensed Saudi 
local brokerage firm buys and holds shares on behalf of its foreign customers. 
Any profits, losses and dividends are then passed on to the foreign customers. 
Furthermore, there are ongoing discussions to permit full and direct participation 
by foreign investors as part of the general attempts at enhancing CG standards, 
disclosure and transparency in the market.
3. For brevity, the authors avoid extensive discussions of these provisions, but the 
appendix contains the relevant sections and the detail provisions of the 2006 
Saudi CG Code.
4. Unlike most prior studies, the study’s analysis is informed by insights from a 
number of theories, including agency, legitimacy, resource dependence and 
stakeholder theories. As these are, however, widely available in the literature, 
the authors do not engage in detailed discussions of their meanings and underly-
ing assumptions. Similarly the authors will like to acknowledge the possibility 
that the predictions of these theories may not be compatible with each other 
and thereby potentially impeding their ability to enhance our interpretations by 
combining them. However, Chen and Roberts (2010) suggest that multitheoreti-
cal perspective should focus on theories that have a number of commonalities, 
including concepts, assumptions and predictions. Consequently, agency, legiti-
macy, resource dependence and stakeholder theories are selected because of their 
common foci. In addition and given that CG is a complex phenomenon, we con-
sider it to be right to apply a multitheoretical perspective, whereby certain com-
ponents of voluntary CG disclosures may be explained more by some theories 
(more appropriate or applicable) than others.
5. The authors note that because a considerable number of popular corporate board 
mechanisms, such as CEO role duality, frequency of board meetings, the pro-
portion of independent non-executive directors, the presence of board subcom-
mittees (e.g., audit, nomination and remuneration committees) and executive 
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compensation information are contained in the Saudi CG Code (see the appen-
dix), the authors are unable to include them as part of the potential factors that 
can explain observable cross-sectional differences in the level of voluntary dis-
closure of recommended CG practices. The study’s analysis is, therefore, limited 
to corporate board factors (e.g., board size) and other CG mechanisms (e.g., 
audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee), which are not already con-
tained in the Saudi CG index. The authors note this as a potential limitation of 
the study, and therefore discussed as part of the avenues for future research in the 
summary and conclusion section.
6. Even though binary scoring scheme may fail to capture the relative importance of 
the various CG provisions (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Beattie, McInnes, & 
Fearnley, 2004; J. Unerman, 2000), the authors adopt it for a number of reasons. 
First, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical framework on 
which weights could be correctly assigned to different CG provisions, and thus 
using dichotomous scoring scheme obviates a situation, whereby our disclosure 
indices are excessively dominated by a particular set of CG provisions (Botosan, 
1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, the findings of past studies suggest that 
the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give similar results (Barako 
et al., 2006; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Fourth, binary scoring scheme is less subjec-
tive and easy to replicate (Henry, 2008). Finally, using a binary scheme to score 
disclosures in annual reports is supported by a rigorously established theoretical 
and empirical literature (Alsaeed, 2006; Botosan, 1997; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Rouf, 2011; Tsamenyi, 
Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007; Vinnicombe, 2010).
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